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Temporary job protection and productivity growth in EU economies 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The present study examines national and sectoral differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in 
fourteen European countries and ten sectors from 1995 to 2007. The main aim is to ascertain the 
influence of employment protection for temporary contracts on TFP by estimating its effects using a 
“difference-in-difference” approach. The results indicate that the deregulation of temporary 
contracts negatively influences TFP growth in European economies and that, within the sectoral 
analysis, the influence of this liberalisation is greater in industries in which firms are more used to 
opening short-term positions. Furthermore, we find that liberalising temporary employment 
discourages training and the acquisition of firm-specific skills.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses productivity disparities in European Union economies over a period 
(1995-2007) that has witnessed a marked slow-down in average European efficiency growth and 
significant intra-European cross-country differences. Other studies have shown that from the 
mid-1990s until 2005, EU countries lost ground relative to the US, not because of adverse 
changes in labour composition or insufficient rates of capital accumulation, but due to the lack 
of innovation capability (Inklaar et al. 2008, van Ark et al. 2008). These prior works also found 
that a prominent role in explaining cross-country labour productivity differences was played by 
growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), the efficiency component that reflects disembodied 
technical changes that are not embodied in the quality of inputs and are attributable to 
organisational and institutional determinants. In addition, it was also noted that the differentials 
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in the rates of efficiency improvement in the use of inputs among European economies mainly 
involved market services that indicated a widening of the productivity gap with respect to other 
sectors (Inklaar et al. 2008).  
The issue of TFP growth and its heterogeneity within EU economies has been reconsidered in- 
the present paper, whose main aim is to more closely examine the role of labour market reforms 
related to temporary jobs. The paper highlights the key role of labour regulation of temporary 
contracts in explaining TFP heterogeneity within the EU economies and accounting for the 
divergence of productivity growth among sectors.  
After the mid-1990s, the liberalisation of labour markets was recorded in Europe; among the 
main policy reversals, new regulatory frameworks for temporary contracts were introduced. 
These types of reform have been applied in various countries, albeit at different speeds, and 
have been more frequently adopted than changes in rules for regular jobs. As a result, a steady 
increase of temporary employment has characterised several European economies and the 
current aggregate evidence indicates that approximately 14% of EU employees work on 
temporary contracts (OECD, 2011). 
The deeper motives for the promotion of labour market flexibility are found in the 
theoretical literature on the potential costs and benefits of the protection of short-term positions. 
Indeed, temporary contracts may exert two probable but opposing effects on productivity.  
On the one hand, these contracts favour all reallocation processes triggered by technology or 
demand shocks, which call for faster adaptation and job changes. They may also have an 
incentive effect, assuming that fixed-term workers aim to obtain permanent positions. Hence, 
these arrangements may serve as screening devices for the selection of new employees 
(Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005, p. 2). In addition, in the case of rigid regulations for permanent 
contracts, temporary workers play a role as ‘buffer stock’ because firms can adjust their 
workforces by varying the number of temporary contracts, thus quickly responding to changes 
in demand and technology.  
On the other hand, as theoretically argued by Blanchard and Landier (2002), the 
deregulation of temporary contracts may merely increase turnover in the labour market because 
permanent jobs remain costly to dissolve due to severe restrictions on dismissals. Indeed, firms 
will be reluctant to retain workers after their temporary contracts expire and hire them for 
regular jobs even if the ‘match’ is productive. This situation arises because firms cannot freely 
choose to separate later on, as such instances are normally subject to firing costs. The authors 
also offer evidence in the French case – over the period from 1983 to 2000 – that 
unambiguously confirms that partial reforms in employment protection may be perverse: when 
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firms are allowed to hire workers on fixed-term contracts, the outcomes are “more low 
productivity entry-level jobs, fewer regular jobs and, so, lower overall productivity and output” 
(Blanchard and Landier, 2002, p. F215). 
In the same vein, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) focus on the transitional ‘honeymoon effect’ of 
labour market reforms, which aim to allow some flexibility by implementing reforms ‘at the 
margin’. Two-tiered reforms, as argued by the authors through a dynamic model of labour 
demand verified for the Italian case, produce an increase in short-term employment but also a 
slowdown in productivity caused by a decrease in the marginal returns of labour services (Boeri 
and Garibaldi, 2007). 
Additional considerations concern human capital accumulation and productivity. Indeed, as 
shown by Belot and van Ours (2007), labour protection encourages employees to invest in 
match-specific human capital by increasing the probability of the survival of the match, and 
this beneficial effect is stronger in sectors where firm specialisation in competencies is more 
important. This outcome is also more relevant in all contexts where risk-averse employees are 
liquidity-constrained and cannot obtain insurance against dismissal. However, as argued by 
Belot and van Ours, there is a trade-off between these positive effects and the negative 
consequences of EPL, which also raises the costs of separation; this implies that there is a 
positive optimal level of employment protection such that increasing employment protection 
improves welfare over some ranges.  
More general results that are not conditioned by the presence of risk-averse employees and 
financial imperfections are obtained by Ricci and Waldman (2010). In their matching model, 
which is similar to that of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), workers are not able to influence 
the amount of training, which is chosen unilaterally by firms, and a well-designed policy that 
combines firing taxes for newly hired personnel and subsidies for hiring always increases the 
level of training and job tenure with unambiguous positive effects on welfare. 
Concerning comparative empirical studies, there is limited empirical evidence thus far on 
the relationship between employment protection and productivity, and the regulation of 
temporary contracts has obtained even less attention.  
Notice also that the few empirical analyses that have estimated the influence of measures of 
employment protection on productivity, such as the works of Nickell and Layard (1999) and 
Dew-Becker and Gordon (2012), have used aggregate regression analysis to examine the 
relationship between employment protection legislation (EPL) and productivity. However, the 
validity of these types of investigations may be limited by confounding factors that influence 
the cross-country effects of EPL. This problem is addressed by Micco and Pages (2006) and 
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Bassanini et al. (2009), who use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the influence of 
national institutional variables by controlling for industry effects.  
The present paper adopts the same difference-in-difference approach but gives special 
attention to the regulation of temporary jobs rather than focusing on aggregate measures of 
employment protection or the protection of regular jobs, which has already been done by the 
authors mentioned above. Indeed, the major contribution of this paper is to ascertain the role of 
the protection of this type of job in explaining the ample differentials in TFP recorded in EU 
economies. It finds that the deregulation of temporary workers negatively influences TFP 
growth and, within a sectoral analysis, that these effects are greater in industries in which firms 
are more used to making staff changes by opening short-term positions. In particular, in labour-
intensive sectors such as services, fixed-term contracts, which imply shorter-term jobs and 
lower employment tenures, may discourage investment in skills and have detrimental effects on 
TFP.  
This result represents the major contribution of the present paper. On the one hand, this 
paper integrates the only partially answered question of the poor performance of the tertiary 
sector, which has already been highlighted by Inklaar et al. (2008). On the other hand, it sheds 
light on the influence of regulations of short-term contracts on efficiency changes, thus it  
significantly contributes to broadening the available literature (Micco and Pages, 2006; 
Bassanini et al.2009), which is mainly focused on the regulation of permanent jobs. Notice that 
Bassanini et al. (2009) introduce in some specifications the employment protection for 
temporary workers as a control for their key explanatory variable (regulation of permanent 
contracts) and obtain that stricter protection for temporary workers positively influence TFP 
growth only when job turnover rates of the United States is used as a	  proxy	   for	  underlying	  propensity	  to	  use	  temporary	  contracts	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  EPLT.	  	  
Unlike these authors, we use the sectoral share of temporary workers in the UK as a proxy 
for underlying propensity to use temporary contracts and obtain always positive and significant 
effects of the stringency of protection for this category of workers on TFP growth. 
This article also demonstrates that labour liberalisation negatively influences the provision 
of work-related training and thus offers additional support to the thesis that policies oriented 
toward flexibility through lower training are ultimately detrimental to improvements in	  
efficiency.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data and their sources, and Section 
3 offers some descriptive statistics concerning the key variables used in the econometric 
analysis. Section 4 discusses the econometric strategy and estimates, and Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Data and sources 
Our empirical investigation relies on several databases: EU KLEMS accounts (see Timmer et al. 
2007), the OECD indexes for employment protection and product market regulation (Venn, 2009; 
Conway and Nicoletti, 2006), EUROSTAT, the ICTWSS database of Visser (2011) and the 
Comparative Political Dataset III (Armingeon et al. 2011).  
The key variables used to study the influence of employment protection on TFP growth, as well as 
other control variables, are provided by these different databases; thus, the first step of our research 
involved matching them and carrying out a disaggregated analysis at the sector and country levels. 
First, the availability of data and the need for a large and consistent sector and country profiles led 
us to select only 14 countries out of the 27 European Union members and to re-arrange the NACE 
rev.1 sections into 10 industries.  
This approach made it possible to compare the following economies: Austria, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. This selection, as noted above, was dictated by data availability 
and includes two sets of countries: i) 12 Old Member States and ii) 2 New Member States. The 
second small set comprises Hungary and the Czech Republic, two “market-oriented” economies 
with some similarities to the Anglo-Saxon countries (European Commission, 2004). 
The selected sectors consist of: 1) Agriculture, 2) Mining and Quarrying, 3) Manufacturing, 4) 
Energy, 5) Construction, 6) Wholesale and Retail Trade, 7) Hotels and Restaurants, 8) Transport, 
Storage and Communications, 9) Financial Intermediation, Real Estate and Business Services and 
10) Community, Social and Personal Services. 
We selected the dependent variable of our econometric estimates, TFP growth, from the EU 
KLEMS database. One of the main advantages of this database is its detailed breakdown of 
industries and service sectors and its decomposition of labour productivity; it is also worth noting 
that this decomposition was computed by considering differences in labour quality (highly skilled, 
medium-skilled and low-skilled, gender and different age classes) and a broad selection of asset 
types (distinction between ICT capital and non-ICT capital services). 
In addition, we used EU KLEMS to estimate TFP levels, which allowed us to compute the distance 
of TFP from the technological frontier, i.e., the ratio of TFP in a specific country and industry to the 
TFP level of the leader in that industry (Aghion and Griffith, 2005; Griffith et al., 2004). For 
additional details on TFP growth and TFP levels, see the appendix.  
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From the OECD database, we selected the set of explanatory variables related to labour and product 
market regulation, i.e., employment protection legislation for regular and temporary workers (EPLR 
and EPLT, respectively) and the indicator of regulatory impact that measures the ‘knock-on’ effects 
of regulation in non-manufacturing sectors on all sectors of the economy (RI).  
Union density and bargaining coverage are drawn from the ICTWSS database of Visser (2011). 
The important explanatory variables of TFP used as controls, particularly sectoral R&D expenses, 
which were standardised to value added, were taken from EUROSTAT. This database was also 
used to compute the share of workers with temporary jobs to total employees at the sector and 
country levels. In the descriptive analysis, we used this indicator for information on the actual 
utilisation of labour market flexibility. We also introduced the sectoral average level of this ratio for 
the UK as a benchmark in our difference-in-difference model, i.e., as the underlying propensity to 
use temporary workers in the absence of EPLT1.  
In addition, the UK percentage ratio of annual lay-offs to total employment was introduced as a 
proxy for lay-off propensity in the absence of EPLR and was obtained from the waves of the UK 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey released by the Office of National Statistics. The indicators for 
formal training were obtained from the EUROSTAT Continuing Vocational Training Survey 
(CVTS). Finally, we used two indicators for the political orientation of governments and 
parliaments as instruments in IV estimates. These indicators are drawn from the Comparative 
Political Data Set III (Armingeon et al. 2011). A more detailed description of the data is presented 
in Table A1 in the appendix.  
3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of all data introduced in the econometric analysis. Let us 
begin with the variables of main interest, TFP growth and employment protection. Between 1995 
and 2007, there was a low average rate (0.65% per year) of TFP growth (at the sector and country 
levels) and a much lower median value (0.29%); this implies that the average figures were the result 
of huge country and sectoral differentials, as also signalled by the high value of the standard 
deviation (6.03). During the same period, the strictness of the protection of temporary workers 
reached a lower level than that offered to regular workers, as shown by the comparison between 
EPLT (1.76) and EPLR (2.26). The difference was also greater when we consider the indicator per 
permanent contract (EPLR refined), which includes provisions for collective dismissals (2.52). In 
addition, the variability in the degree of protection for temporary workers across countries was 
much greater than that registered for regular workers (the standard deviations were 1.12 and 0.64, 
respectively).  
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Additional information from the comparison between the beginning and the end of the period (see 
appendix, Table A.2) reveals that in 1995, the overall annual TFP growth rate (0.97%) was above 
the average (0.65%) as well as the value registered at the end of the period (- 0.11%). This result 
happened despite the slight increase in R&D intensity (from 0.87 to 1.07 %) and the improvement 
in pro-competitive policies (RI decreased from 0.19 to 0.13). Information from other control 
variables for the labour market shows the declining tendencies of union density and bargaining 
coverage, as well as those of all indicators of continuing vocational training in enterprises. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A visualisation of the changes in the protection of temporary workers is provided in Figure 1, which 
compares EPLT indexes in 1995 and 2007 throughout the EU economies.  
Spain, France, Italy and Belgium are in the group of persistently highly regulated countries, with 
EPLT values above the median either in 1995 and 2007. Italy, which in 1995 had the strictest 
regulations for temporary contracts, later implemented a large-scale liberalisation, and the EPLT 
index (which ranges from 0 to 6) fell by 3.5 points. Significant easing was also recorded in Belgium 
(but with a lower reduction of 2 points). Spain, in contrast, has slightly increased restrictions on 
temporary contracts; hence, its employment regulation in 2007 was were still more stringent than 
the EU median. 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Germany shows an important reduction of EPLT and falls under the median in 2007, closely 
approximating the group of moderately regulated countries, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Denmark 
and the Netherlands, which are characterised by stability or slight reductions (notably, Sweden and 
the Netherlands). 
The last group includes countries with low levels of regulation (with EPLT below the 1995 and 
2007 medians); Anglo-Saxon economies and Eastern European countries (Hungary and Czech 
Republic) are included in this group. It is noteworthy that the UK is the country with the most 
flexible labour market over the entire sampled period; thus, the lowest protection levels for both 
regular workers (Venn, 2009) and temporary workers recorded in the UK make it plausible to 
assume that this country shows a ‘natural’ propensity to hire temporary workers, where only 
technological and other idiosyncratic factors matter, irrespective of protective legislation. The same 
reasoning holds for lay-offs in the UK, which, as we will discuss in the next section, is used as 
benchmark for other labour market control variables (EPLR, union density and coverage 
bargaining). 
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Additional confirmation for the validity of choosing the UK as the benchmark country, as in similar 
studies (Bassanini et al.2009; Cingano et al. 2010), is offered by data on the national and sectoral 
diffusion of temporary contracts (see Table 2 and A.3 in appendix). Indeed, in almost all sectors, the 
UK’s propensity to employ fixed-term workers remains quite stable or slightly decreases between 
1995 and 2007, whereas it increases in all other sectors and countries (see Table A.3 in appendix).  
Concerning the sectoral diffusion of temporary workers, we noticed that in almost all countries, 
Agriculture, Hotels and Restaurants, Public Administration and Other Services and Construction 
show propensities to employ temporary workers above their respective median values, whereas the 
opposite is true for Manufacturing and Transport and Communication (see Table 2). 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally, TFP growth rates at the sector and country levels are reported in Table 3. These data 
confirm the great variability in performance across countries and sectors mentioned above. Let us 
take, for example, the countries where EPLT levels decreased: Belgium, Italy, Germany, Sweden 
and the Netherlands. In all these countries, sectors with a low propensity to use temporary workers, 
such as Manufacturing, show an annual average TFP growth rate that is higher than that registered 
in Public Administration or in Hotels and Restaurants, which are sectors with high shares of fixed-
term labour2. Obviously, many factors condition this descriptive result. However, this evidence also 
seems to suggest that a reduction in the protection of temporary workers mainly affects TFP growth 
in sectors that more intensively use this type of contracts and encourages us to further explore this 
issue. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
4. Econometric analysis  
4.1 Estimation strategy 
In this section, we focus on the causal relationship between the protection of temporary workers 
(EPLT) and TFP growth. To identify this effect, we focus on the within-country growth differences 
between industries and over time. 
Indeed, this empirical strategy is based on the assumption that EPLT influences efficiency growth 
in sectors that show higher propensities to use temporary workers and that adjust employment more 
than others. More precisely, following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Bassanini et al. (2009), we 
assume that the difference in TFP growth between any pair of industries (h and k) is equal to the 
expected value (E) of a function of EPLT and its change multiplied by the difference between the 
propensity to employ temporary workers that we find between the two industries. This propensity is 
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measured, as mentioned above, in the UK because this country has the lowest employment 
protection levels for both temporary and regular workers. We thus exploit differences across sectors 
to implement a difference-in-difference method for our sample of 10 industries in 14 EU 
economies. We obtain the following equation: 
	   𝐸 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹𝑃!"# − ∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹𝑃!!! = (Λ! − Λ!) ∙ 𝑓(𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!!!,∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!)	  (1)	  
 
where TFPikt and TFPiht denote TFP in country i and time t; k and h reference the pair of industries; 
and Λ is the average sectoral propensity to use temporary workers over the period from 1995 to 
2007 in the benchmark country (the UK). In other words, the difference in the ‘natural’ propensity 
to employ temporary workers among various industries, multiplied by the different stringencies of 
EPLT across our sample countries, explains the differences in TFP growth rates at the sector and 
country levels. 
Therefore, in the baseline specification, we estimated the following equation: 
 ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐹𝑃!,!,! = 𝛽! Λ!!𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!!! + 𝛽!(Λ!!Δ𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!) + 𝛾!(Λ!!𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅!,!!!) + 𝛾!(Λ!!Δ𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅!,!) + 𝐷!    +  𝐷!,! + 𝜀!,!,!    (2) 
                               
 
where i = 14 countries; j = 10 sectors; t = 1995,…2007; 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇,𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅 and Δ𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇,Δ𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅 are the 
country- and time-varying indexes of employment legislation in level and annual variation, 
respectively; Λ!!,Λ!! are the indicators of the average industrial propensity to use temporary contracts 
and lay-off workers, respectively, in the UK.  
 𝛽!  and  𝛽! are our key coefficients that refer to the interaction terms and capture the actual impact 
of EPLT (in level and variation) on TFP growth. 𝛾!  and  𝛾!are related to the interaction terms of our 
main control variable, EPLR. We also included sector dummies (  𝐷!  ) and country-by-time dummies 
(Dit) to control for country- and sector-specific factors that most likely influence TFP growth and 
that cannot be captured by the labour policy control variables included in our analysis.  
We then gradually added other controls that relate either to other labour and product market 
institutions or to the technological context. We can write the following augmented equation: 
 ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐹𝑃!,!,! = 𝛽!(Λ!!𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!!!) + 𝛽!(Λ!!Δ𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!) + 𝛾!(Λ!!𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅!,!!!)  +  𝛾!(Λ!!Δ𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅!,!)  +  𝛿!(Λ!!𝑿!,!!!) +   𝜑!𝑅𝐼!,!,!!! +  𝜑!∆𝑅𝐼!,!,!  –   𝜗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑇𝐹𝑃!,!,!!! +   𝜔𝑅𝐷!,!,!!! +   𝐷!,!   + 𝐷!" + 𝜀!,!,!    (3) 
 
where, in addition to the variables discussed above, we find 𝑿, a matrix containing other labour 
market institutions at the country level, such as union density and bargaining coverage, that we treat 
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as EPLR (because we assume that these variables are more binding with a higher sectoral 
propensity to lay-off workers); RI, the regulatory product market indicator (in level and variation) at 
the sector and country levels; and research and development expenditures (R&D) and the distance 
from the technological frontier, (RelTFP), two indicators describing innovation that are discussed in 
sections 2 and 3. 
In Equation (3) too, our key explanatory variable is the interaction term concerning EPLT (in level 
and variation). In contrast to Equation 2, we inserted, in addition to other dummies, a sector by time 
term (Djt) that allows us to control for the growth rate of the industrial productivity frontier. 
As we will see in the next section, Equation 3 has been subjected to several robustness checks and 
endogeneity tests by means of instrumental variable methods on both 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇 and ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇. All 
estimations have been run with pooled OLS because, according to Wooldrige (2002), this estimator 
is still unbiased and efficient if we use robust and clustered standard errors that are not serially 
correlated, as guaranteed by a proper test.  
Finally, we also checked whether EPLT affects the accumulation of firm-specific human capital, 
measured by the indicator of continuing vocational training (CVT). The specification is as follows: 𝐶𝑉𝑇!,!,! = 𝛽! Λ!!𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!!! +   𝜇! + 𝜀!,!,!    (4) 
where i=1, …14 countries; j= 1, …10 sectors; t = 1999 and 2005 (the EUROSTAT survey has only 
been performed for these two years); 𝜇! are dummies that capture the specific effects of pro-training 
policies at the country level. The hypothesis behind Equation (4) is that the influence of EPLT on 
TFP growth might also reflect the fact that when restrictions on temporary contracts are more 
stringent, firms and employees have an incentive to increase training. Estimates of Equation 4 test 
this hypothesis. 	   
4.2 Econometric results  
4.2.1 Effects of the regulation of temporary workers  
This subsection presents our main results for the baseline specifications summed up by Equation 2. 
We first test the role of the protection of temporary workers in levels (Table 4, column 1) and then 
gradually add our main controls with regard to the protection of regular workers (EPLR) and annual 
variations in EPLT and EPLR (Table 4, columns 2, 3 and 4, respectively)3. 
Notice that the impact of EPLT on TFP is likely to differ across industries and that we thus need to 
estimate the impact of the degree of its stringency on cross-industry differences by adopting the 
difference-in-difference method described above. With this strategy, we rule out the potential 
confounding factors that influence cross-country variations. Thus, we insert EPLT interacted with 
the share of temporary contracts in the benchmark economy, the UK, i.e., the interaction term EPLT 
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*TWS_Benchi (column 1). Analogously, we also control for the role of EPLR on TFP growth 
including the interaction term EPLR *Lay off Benchi (column 2).  
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 
The results suggest that TFP growth tends to be higher in industries with greater propensities to use 
temporary contracts, the more stringent the level of EPLT. 
Additionally, by introducing the annual variations in EPLT and EPLR (columns 3 and 4), we can 
further verify our main results and find that the estimated effect of EPLT *TWS_Benchi is positive 
and significant. 
Conversely, no significant impacts are found for EPLR, meaning that the stringency of the 
protection of regular workers does not play a significant role in industries where the propensity to 
lay off is higher. Additionally, annual changes in EPL (ΔEPLT and ΔEPLR) do not induce 
significant differences in TFP growth between binding and non-binding sectors. Especially for 
ΔEPLT, this means that we cannot identify the short-run effects of the easing of regulation on TFP 
growth (Bassanini et al, 2009). 
To illustrate our key result for the role of EPLT, let us consider an example.  
According to our estimates (last specifications in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4), a one-point 
restriction on this legislation should increase by 0.126 percentage points the difference in the annual 
TFP growth between two industries whose average rate of the propensity to employ temporary 
workers differs by 1 percentage point. Note that even if the estimated effect for EPLT appears to be 
small, it is not negligible because it depends on both the magnitude of the cumulative change in the 
EPLT indicator over the 1995-2007 period and on sectoral propensities to employ temporary 
workers. To better evaluate the meaning of our key result (i.e., the coefficient of 
EPLT*TWS_Benchi), let us consider, for example, the Hotels and Restaurants and Manufacturing 
sectors. As discussed above (see section 3), in the benchmark country, the UK, the former is an 
industry with a high propensity to use fixed-term contracts, whereas the latter exhibits the opposite 
characteristic.  
We can now quantify the difference in TFP growth between these two sectors recorded in different 
countries (those that have implemented the liberalisation of temporary contracts in our sample 
period) and explain them according to their respective EPLT stances.  
In Table 5 (Panel A), columns 1, 2 and 3 report the values of cumulative TFP growth rates in Hotels 
and Restaurants and Manufacturing, and their difference in each economy, respectively. Column 4 
shows the estimated β coefficient for EPLT*TWS_Benchi in the baseline specifications (columns 3 
and 4 of Table 4), whereas column 5 of Table 5 reports the different natural propensities to use 
temporary contracts, ∆Λ (obtained from the values of the UK), and column 6 presents the 
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cumulative reduction of EPLT (∆EPLTc) in our sample period. Finally, columns 7 and 8 show the 
values (absolute and percentage, respectively) of the difference in TFP growth explained by a lower 
level of labour protection.  
Taking our estimates at face value, the result is especially important for economies showing high 
EPLT levels at the beginning of the sample period (Germany, Belgium and Italy). In Italy in 
particular, more than 22% of the difference in TFP changes between Hotels and Restaurants and 
Manufacturing is explained by the weakening of EPLT.  
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
We replicated the same exercise (Panel B of Table 5) by comparing Finance (a typical knowledge-
intensive sector that includes many business services) with Manufacturing.  
The difference in the propensity to employ temporary workers (∆Λ) between these two sectors is 
lower than that observed in the previous comparison, but it is still important (2.14 %). From our 
estimates, we obtain that if EPLT had not been reduced in Italy, the difference in the cumulative 
TFP growth rate between Finance and Manufacturing would have been 3.59 rather than 2.65, which 
is a difference of 36%. Notice also that this percentage reaches even higher values, approximately 
50%, when the β coefficient for EPLT is obtained in the augmented model that takes technology 
into account (see Table 7 below).  
 
 
4.2.2. Sensitivity to inclusion of controls for institutions and technology 
In the next step, we reconsider the impact of the degree of EPLT stringency on cross-industry 
differences (EPLT *TWS_Benchi), augmenting the model with other institutional and technological 
factors, as suggested by Equation (3). With these additional estimates, we relate to the broad 
literature that explores the role of the main determinants of TFP and obtain a confirmation that 
sectors with higher propensities to use temporary contracts record higher TFP growth in countries 
with more stringent EPLT. Furthermore, the magnitude of this effect is not negligible and is rather 
stable, ranging from 0.084 to 0.185 (see Tables 6 and 7). Notice that Bassanini et al., (2009) 
introduce EPLT, interacted with the UK lay-off rates or the US job turnover rates, as controls. 
These authors find that only EPLT interacted with turnover rates has a positive and significant 
influence on TFP growth. Conversely, we use the sectoral fraction of temporary workers in the UK 
as a proxy of the intrinsic propensity to hire temporary workers and obtain that the influence of 
EPLT on TFP growth is always significant and positive. Notice also that protection for regular 
workers in levels and variations remains insignificant. It is conceivable that in our sample period, 
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which was characterised by high recourse to temporary contracts, the main driving force has been 
represented by provisions concerning short-term jobs that likely capture all effects of labour 
regulation on efficiency changes. 
We begin our analysis by considering the degree of competition, which is captured by the 
regulatory indicator, i.e., RI and its annual variations, ΔRI. Indeed, there is now a consensus that 
two main effects may operate: i) competition stimulates incumbent companies to increase their TFP 
by adopting new technologies and innovations, and ii) competition favours a process of creative 
destruction generated by the entry of new innovators and exit of former innovators, as clearly 
shown in the new Schumpeterian approach proposed by Aghion and Griffith (2005). Our results 
confirm that improvements in TFP are likely to be adopted when firms operate in product markets 
that are experiencing liberalisation because TFP improvements are positively associated with 
changes in RI (columns 1 and 6 of Table 6), whereas the level of RI has the expected negative sign, 
although it is not significant. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
We also estimate the role of labour market characteristics, such as union density (UD), collective 
bargaining coverage (COV) and their interaction4, but find that these factors are not significant 
(Table 6). One plausible reason for this finding is that in confrontational environments, defensive 
clauses (due to greater labour power, captured by our institutional variables) encourage pro-
productivity practices but also reinforce workers’ rent-seeking behaviours, with inconclusive results 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
With an additional set of estimates (Table 7) we consider technology: i) the ratio of R&D 
expenditures on value added at the sector and country levels (columns 1, 2, and 3); ii) the distance 
from the technological frontier (RelTFP) of a given industry (columns 4, 5, and 6); and iii) both 
variables (columns 7, 8, and 9). 
The introduction of RelTFP allows us to take the convergence hypothesis into account: country-
sectors lagging behind the country leader in a given industry are motivated to shorten the distance 
from the technological frontier by adopting technological innovations such as those developed by 
the industry leaders. Thus, according to these catching-up processes, TFP growth increases when 
the distance from the frontier is larger. Our findings support this hypothesis, as shown by the 
negative and significant coefficient for RelTFP in all specifications, in line with evidence presented 
by other studies (Griffith et al., 2004; Bassanini et al., 2009). 
R&D intensity is another important determinant of TFP growth. Indeed, we expect that R&D, 
which is also a proxy for the entire set of intangibles not computed in input expenses, such as 
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knowledge and organisational capital, may contribute to determining the ‘residual’ aggregate of 
TFP, as clearly reported by Inklaar et al. (2008, pp. 148-149). Our estimates for R&D confirm this 
hypothesis (columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 7). However, interestingly, the significance of this variable 
vanishes when we account for the distance to the frontier (columns 4-9 of Table 7). One reason for 
this result is that R&D not only stimulates innovation but also plays an additional role in facilitating 
‘the imitation of other discoveries’, as shown by Griffith et al. (2004). Thus, when we introduce the 
productivity frontier, we also likely take the influence of research and development on TFP into 
account, i.e., its stimulus to speed up the pace of innovation, thus explaining the non-significant 
coefficient for R&D. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2.3. Other robustness checks 
Thus far, we have tested the role of the protection of regular workers, focusing only on firing costs 
for individual dismissals and finding that they are irrelevant in terms of TFP growth. A robustness 
check has been performed by including a refined indicator of EPLR that also takes collective 
dismissals into account (further details about this index are in Table A.1 in the appendix).  
After replacing EPLR with the new and more comprehensive indicator, the estimated effects of 
regulations on individual and collective dismissals remain non-significant in 7 out of the 9 
regressions reported in Table 8, whereas temporary protection is still positive and significant. 
Notice that the availability of the refined EPLR index from 1998 only, leads us to change the 
estimation period; a different time span (1998-2007) represents a further step in the sensitivity 
analysis of our results.  
Additional estimates for different time periods (1995-2004; 1997-2006; 1998-2007) have been 
performed to test the role of our key variable, i.e., temporary protection, and almost all these 
estimates led to estimated coefficient values that are similar to those obtained in previous 
regressions (see the appendix, Tables A.5, A.6, A.7).  
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our findings appear to be robust to the last sensitivity test, which was performed by excluding the 
aggregate of ‘Community, Social, Personal Services and No-Market Services’ (Table 9, columns 1-
4). The elimination of this sector, which includes government, health and education, is attributable 
to measurement problems that make calculations of output and productivity highly problematic and 
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justify its exclusion, as was done in similar analyses (see also Timmer et al., 2007). Our findings, 
which are restricted to the market economy, confirm the significant and positive effects of EPLT: 
lower restrictions on temporary jobs have negative effects on efficiency in market economy 
industries in which, in the absence of regulations, firms tend to rely on short-term positions to make 
workforce changes. 
 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2.4 Endogeneity  
The possible endogeneity of labour regulations deserves further attention. It is conceivable that 
economies that exhibit poor performance in terms of TFP have a high demand for the revision of 
their employment protection legislations. Notice, however, that in our estimates using the 
difference-in-differences approach, the introduction of lagged regressors and country fixed effects 
should mitigate potential endogeneity. 
In any case, to remove all doubts concerning the identification of causal effects, we carried out 
instrumental variable estimates and implemented an endogeneity test for our key variables. This 
method requires finding instruments that can predict the level and annual changes in EPLT without 
directly affecting the impact on TFP growth. Following Wooldridge (2002), it is plausible to 
assume that if the main effects (EPLT and ∆EPLT in our case) are correlated with instruments, this 
is also true for the interaction terms, EPLT *TWSBenchi and ∆EPLT *TWSBenchi.  
First, we introduce as instruments some key variables related to political institutions and some 
labour market characteristics that are not correlated with our dependent variable. These external 
instruments are: i) the Schmidt Index of Cabinet Composition (which ranges from 0 to 5, from the 
lowest to highest percentages of seats of left-wing parties in the cabinet), ii) the percentage of left-
wing party parliamentary seats relative to all governmental parties (weighted by the number of days 
the government was in office in a given year); and iii) union density. The last variable may be a 
valid instrument because it is not correlated with TFP growth, as shown by its non-significance in 
all previous estimates (see Tables 6, 8 and 9). At the same time, it may influence our key regressor 
EPLT. 
In addition, we also performed a robustness check of instrumental variable estimations by repeating 
the endogeneity tests with internal instruments, namely, the same interaction terms taken at time t-1 
and t-2. 
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We ran two baseline specifications in which we separately tested endogeneity for EPLT 
*TWSBench i and ∆EPLT *TWSBench i5. 
In the first column of Table 10, EPLT*TWSBenchi has been instrumented with the external 
instruments discussed above. From the endogeneity tests, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
our key regressor can be treated as an exogenous variable. In addition, the coefficient of our 
instrumented variable, EPLT*TWSBenchi, shows the expected sign but is not significantly different 
from zero. This result most likely occurs because the external instruments are weak, as signalled by 
the value of the Wald F Statistic of Kleibergen-Paap6.  
For this reason, we also used internal instruments, i.e., the lagged values of EPLT *TWSBenchi at 
time t-1 and t-2. The second column presents the results of this strategy. In this case, all tests 
confirm the validity of the internal instruments7. The coefficient of interest (0.144) is now positive, 
significant and not so different from the value obtained with the OLS estimates. Again, the 
endogeneity test tells us that EPLT*TWSBenchi can be treated as an exogenous variable; in this 
context, OLS is an unbiased estimator and more efficient than the IV/GMM estimator (Wooldridge, 
2002; Baum, 2003; 2007). 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
In the third and fourth columns, we apply the same strategy for ∆EPLT*TWSBench i, obtaining the 
same results. As in the OLS estimates, the coefficient of this regressor is not significant.  
To summarise, all the results of the IV strategy confirm our previous results and verify that our key 
regressors are exogenous. 
 
4.2.5 Employment protection legislation and training 
All our main findings suggest, but do not directly prove, that EPLT liberalisation causes an 
inadequate accumulation of human capital, which, in turn, negatively influences organisational 
capabilities and all disembodied technological changes within firms, thus leading to disappointing 
TFP performance. Indeed, we expect that the progressive deregulation of short-term contracts and 
the consequential diffusion of these flexible contracts exert negative effects on the accumulation of 
human capital. Conversely, workers can afford to invest in firm-specific skills when the 
employment relationship is expected to last (Wasmer, 2006). Indeed, according to the human capital 
approach, as shown by Arulampalam and Booth (1998), the probability of investing in work-related 
training is higher the longer the post-training period over which agents can amortise their 
investments is.  
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Notice that empirical investigations usually only partially capture these types of associations 
because training recorded in available surveys is typically formal, whereas informal training, which 
takes place especially in small firms, is not registered. 
In any case, we offer additional evidence for our sampled countries by testing the influence of 
EPLT on four measures of formal training provided by the Eurostat Continuing Vocational Training 
Survey (CVTS), one of the most important sources of internationally comparable data for the 
European Community, conducted for 1999 and 2005. The data are only available for two years, 
which led us to be very cautious. In any case, we exploit all available information and thus use four 
different indicators for the incidence and intensity of training as dependent variables: i) percentage 
of employees participating in CVT courses (CvtEmpl); ii) hours in CVT courses per employee 
(CvtHempl); iii) hours in CVT courses per 1,000 hours worked (CvtHwor); and iv) training 
enterprises as percentage of all enterprises (CvtFirm).  
The results reported in Table 11 show, as we expected, that the incidence of training is affected by 
EPLT: the difference-in-difference estimates suggest that training tends to be lower in industries 
with greater propensities to use temporary contracts when the level of EPLT is less stringent. The 
rationale behind this finding is that lower degrees of EPLT likely cause the shortening of agents’ 
time horizons and negatively affect the incidence and intensity of formal training programmes. This 
result is obtained for employees, hours and firms involved in CVT and is also present when 
controlling for country effects.  
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We find that since 1995, EU countries have not followed homogenous patterns of growth, and 
additional heterogeneity has been caused by sectoral diversity: between-sector gaps are crucial, and 
the worst performance in terms of total factor productivity is recorded in some service sectors.  
We have analysed these country-sector disparities in 14 EU economies and have then focused on 
some driving forces, such as the stringency of the employment protection of temporary jobs. Our 
empirical results show that liberalisation has had a detrimental influence on TFP, especially in 
sectors in which firms are more used to opening short-term positions.  
These findings have been validated by various robustness checks. We have controlled for the 
employment protection of regular workers, considering restrictions on individual and collective 
dismissals; furthermore, we have controlled for other institutional variables (unions, bargaining 
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coverage, product market regulation) and technological factors that might have exerted a 
simultaneous impact on TFP. Our regressions cover all the industries in each economy, but are also 
restricted to market sectors, whose growth accounting is affected by minor measurement problems.  
One interpretation of these findings is that low levels of employee protection discourage long-term 
relationships and thus cause low investments in training because they do not offer incentives for 
workers to upgrade their skills. Thus, it is likely that the agents that should bear the training costs 
(firms or employees) do not find convenient work-related training when they expect job positions to 
be short-term, confirming that more stable employment prospects positively influence vocational 
training. Our supplementary estimates for training, which is negatively affected by labour flexibility 
policies, support these considerations: liberalising temporary work employment may discourage 
training and the acquisition of firm-specific skills.  
Concerning policy implications, pro-competitive product market policies may play a positive role in 
efficiency growth, whereas the liberalisation of the labour market for temporary contracts 
negatively offsets this positive influence. In addition, our results suggest that the scope of two-
tiered reforms seems to be limited, not only in terms of non-lasting employment growth (as shown 
in other studies, e.g., Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007) but also in terms of efficiency. Countries can reach 
the same level of aggregate labour flexibility, but they exhibit different TFP performance when they 
choose a different composition of regular and temporary restrictions. If firms in high-EPL countries 
can circumvent strict regulations by hiring workers for short-term jobs, they pay for this form of 
liberalisation with poor TFP improvements.  
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NOTES 
1 We provide further details about the benchmark identification in the next sections. 
2 The only exception is the Public Administration TFP growth in Italy, whose negative value is, in absolute 
terms, lower than that recorded in Manufacturing. 
3 We calculated robust standard errors that are clustered at the sector-country level, to account for 
heteroskedasticity and intra-panel correlation. The Wooldridge test guarantees that our pooled OLS 
estimations are not affected by other forms of serial correlation: the p-value reported in the table shows that 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the absence of serial correlation. 
4 Notice that UD and COV are available only at the country level; we thus adopt a difference-in-difference 
strategy and test the hypothesis that their protective roles are higher in sectors that are more exposed to 
threats of dismissals, i.e. with higher layoff rates. 
5 The first stage estimates are reported in Table A.8. 
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6 Both the J statistic of Hansen (the over-identification test) and the Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic (the under-
identification test) show that the instruments are valid and the model is well-specified. However, the Wald F 
Statistic of Kleibergen-Paap is below 10, which indicates that the correlation between the regressor and the 
instruments is weak (Baum, 2003; 2007). 
7 The p-values of the over- and under-identification tests confirm that the instruments are valid; in addition, 
the Wald F Statistic of Kleibergen-Paap confirms that the instruments are not weak. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TFP growth, TFP levels and the distance to the frontier 
The total factor productivity growth index is made available by the EUKLEMS database and 
measures the efficiency improvements in the use of inputs; in other words, it measures the reduction 
in input costs to produce a given amount of output. This measure reflects disembodied technical 
changes, i.e., those changes not embodied in the quality of inputs.  
More precisely, the TFP growth ( AlnΔ ) used in this paper is calculated as the real growth of value 
added minus a weighted growth of inputs for a given industry: 
Δ lnAij = Δ lnYijt − vijtKΔ lnKijt − vijtLΔ lnLijt  (1) 
 
where Δ lnYijt , Δ ln Kijt  and Δ ln Lijt denote, respectively, the growth of value added (Y), capital (K) 
and hours worked (L) in country i and sector j, between t-1 and t, whereas Kijtv  and 
L
ijtv  are the two 
period average shares of inputs, K and L, respectively, on value added.  
It is worth noting that L and K take the heterogeneity of labour and capital assets, respectively, into 
account. Indeed, as shown by Timmer et al. 2007, p.24:  
 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐿! = 𝑣!,!∆𝑙𝑛𝐻!,!!  
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where the weights 𝑣!,! are given by the average shares of compensation for each type of labour in 
the value of labour compensation vl,t =1/ 2[vl,t + vl,t−1]  and vl,t = Pl,tLHl,t
l
∑
"
#
$
%
&
'
−1
Pl,tLHl,t  , with Pl,tL
representing the price of one hour (H) of work of l type.  
 
The different quality of labour l considers educational levels (low, medium and high-skilled 
workers), gender and three different age bands (15-19, 30-49, 50 and over). For the matching and 
harmonisation of educational levels and worker skills across countries, see Timmer et al. (2007). 
The capital stock is constructed by the well-known perpetual inventory method, which is a weighted 
sum of past investments, with weights given by the relative efficiencies of capital goods at different 
ages. The heterogeneity of capital stock is defined as 
 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐾! = 𝑣!,!∆𝑙𝑛𝐴!,!!  
 
where Ak are different assets, whereas weights 𝑣!,! are given by the average share of each 
component in the value of capital compensation vk,t =1/ 2[vk,t + vk,t−1]  and vk,t = Pk,tK Ak,t
l
∑
"
#
$
%
&
'
−1
Pk,tK Ak,t , 
with Pk,tK  being the price of capital services from assets of type k.  
 
Nine different asset types are included in the total capital stock, including three ICT assets: 
Computing equipment, Communications equipment and Software (see Timmer et al., 2007 for 
further details). 
Unfortunately, EUKLEMS makes TFP growth data available, but not information on TFP levels. 
Hence, to determine the distance to the frontier, we need to estimate time-varying TFP values 
across different sector-countries. More precisely, following Griffith et al. (2004), we estimated a 
value-added-based measure of TFP as follows: 
 
lnTFPijt = lnYijt −α lnKijt − (1−α)lnLijt  
 
where Y is the real value added in Euro PPP and 1995 prices, K is the fixed real capital stock in 
Euro PPP and 1995 prices, L is the hours worked,  and  are the estimated parameters, that 
is, the output elasticity of Capital and Labour, respectively. We gathered data concerning these 
output and inputs from EUKLEMS database, with the exception of France and Belgium, for which 
the capital stock variables came from the OECD Stan database. We exclude Ireland and Hungary 
α (1−α)
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because data on the capital stock of these countries were not available. Therefore, in regressions 
where we use the distance to the frontier, the sample is reduced to 12 countries. 
We then defined the frontier as the country with the highest value of lnTFP in each industry (j) at 
time (t) (denoted lnTFPFjt). Subtracting TFPFjt from TFPijt, we obtain a measure of relative TFP, 
which is the distance to the frontier indicator. 
Re lTFPijt = lnTFPijt − lnTFPFit  
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